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RECENT CASES
ing opinion pointed out that the ordinary meaning of the word "accident"
may include many injuries and any number of collisions. To illustrate this,
the following report from the New York Times was cited: "Two persons
were killed, seven persons were injured and twenty-seven vehicles, includ-
ing a bus and three tncks, were damaged today in four accidents on a fog-
shrouded, half-mile section of the New Jersey Turnpike. The four accidents
occurred within twenty minutes .... 9
For years insurance companies have used the words "one accident" or
"each accident" to limit liability. The standard automobile liability policy
limits coverage to a fixed amount for bodily injuries to "each person", a larger
anount for all bodily injuries resulting from "each accident" and a fixed
amount for property damage resulting from "each accident". 1° Obviously,
when used with reference to bodily injury, the phrase, "each accident" must
necessarily contemplate the inclusion of injuries to more than one individual
since, if the injury to each person were viewed as a separate accident, the
higher limit would become meaningless. It is submitted that the intention
of the parties, when using the word "accident", is to include injury or dam-
age to as many individuals as may be involved in one general catastrophe
or mishap, so long as the injuries flow from a common act of negligence,
provided a substantial amount of time has not intervened between injuries.
It is the ordinary meaning of the word that must control in seeking the in-
tention of the parties."1 Given an ordinary interpretation, then, a single
accident will include the damage to two vehicles when they collide although
the property of two individuals is damaged. The press and radio, with their
great influence on the language, have accorded such a meaning to the word
and there is little apparent reason for attaching a different meaning whcn
it is used in an insurance policy.
JON N. VOGEL
SALES - REMEDIES OF BUYER - ELECTION OF REMEDIES. - Plaintiff, a
candy manufacturer, purchased pecans from defendant and used some of
them in candy. The defective condition of the pecans was discovered after
some candy had been returned by customers. Plaintiff, upon suggestion of
Defendant, returned the unused pecans in exchange for enough usable
pecans to make up the deficiency. Plaintiff then sued for damages for the
loss of the value of the candy in which the defective pecans were used and
for the loss of prospective profits and good will resulting from sale of the
candy containing the defective pecans. Defendant contended Plaintiff had
9. Instant case at 589 (dissenting opinion).
10. 4 Richards. Law of Insurance 2083, 2084 (5th ed. 1952) (A reprint of the
Standard Automobile Policy Garage Liability).
11. Instant case at 590 (dissenting opinion) "Since 1891 the word 'accident', certainly
in relation to highway disasters, has acquired a very definite meaning in the United States.";
Perkins v. Fireman's Fund Indemnity Co., 44 Cal. App. 2d 427, 112 P.2d 670, 672
(1941) "Obviously, the words 'one person' refer to the injured person, and the words 'one
..ccident' to the inury of several persons, regardless of how many may suffer loss by reason
thereof."; Wilderman v. Watters, 149 Neb. 102, 30 N.W.2d 301, 303, 304 (1948) "The
cardinal rule in the interpretation of a contract is to ascertain the intention of the parties,
and to give effect to such intention if it can be done consisently with legal principles. In
construing contracts the court's sole duty is to ascertain what was meant by the language
of the instrument."
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
elected one remedy accorded by statute for breach of warranty and was
therefore barred from claiming another remedy. The Minnesota statute
provided, "when the buyer has claimed and been granted a remedy in any
one of these ways, no other remedy can thereafter be granted".1 The district
court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. On appeal it was
held that the return of the unusable pecans in exchange for salable pecans
did not show, as a matter of law, an election of remedies and an intended
recission of the purchase contract which would preclude an action for dam-
ages. There was a genuine issue of material fact which precluded summary
judgment. Abdallah v. Martin, 65 N.W.2d 641 (Minn. 1954).
As a conceptual and practical matter this decision seems sound. North
Dakota, under the Uniform Sales Act, has a statute similar to that cited in
the instant case.2 It provides that the buyer upon a breach of warranty
may "at his election" keep the goods and deduct compensation for the de-
fect from the contract price, sue for damages for breach of warranty, reject
the goods if title has not passed and sue for damages or rescind the con-
tract of sale and recover what has been paid. It similarly provides that
claiming one remedy precludes resort to any other. This type of statute
has been criticized on the ground that it embodies the principle that re-
scission as to the passage of title also constitutes a rescission of the purchase
contract, thus making it impossible for a buyer to recover consequential
damages for the breach of that contract. 3
Although authorities are not in agreement as to what acts will constitute
an election, 4 it is stated that any decisive act of a party with knowledge of
his rights and the facts, indicating an intent to pursue one remedy rather
than another, constitutes an election. 5 However, the act itself must not be
equivocal or ambiguous in nature.6
A parallel problem arose in Maryland where a buyer of defective hair
lacquer pads was allowed to maintain an action for damages, notwithstand-
ing the return of the unused portion of the goods for which credit was
given.7 It was aptly stated in the concurring opinion that, "rescission of a
Roebuck & Co., 24 N.J. Super. 295, 94 A.2d 348, 352 (1952).
contract, like making a contract, is a matter of intention.... .. In another
case involving a buyer who had rejected a final shipment of defective boots
it was held there was not necessarily a rescission of the purchase contract
precluding recovery of consequential damages directly resulting from breach
of warranty. 8 Where a buyer had returned defective jellies, claiming .only
damages for breach of warranty and indicating no intention to rescind, it was
held there had been no election to rescind which prevented recovery of con-
1. Minn. Stat. §512.69(2) (1953).
2. N. D. Rev. Code §51-0170 (1943).
3. See Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality and Society, 37 Col.L.Rev. 341, 390 (1937);
Rogge, Damages Upon Rescission for Breach of Warranty, 28 Mich.L.Rev. 26, 40 (1929);
43 Harv.L.Rev. 328 (1929).
4. Armour & Co. v. Lambdin, 154 Fla. 86, 16 So.2d 805, 810 (1944).
5. Strong v. Reeves, 280 App. Div. .301, 114 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup.Ct. 1952); Lumber
Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. of New York v. Friedman, 176 Misc. 703, 28 N.Y.S.2d 506, 509
(Sup.Ct. 1941).
6. Barry v. Cronin, 272 Masg. 477, 172 N.E. 595 (1930) (intention to rescind not
displayed in unequivocal and unqualified manner); Walter-Wallingford Coal Co. v. A.
Himes Coal Co., 223 Mich. 576, 194 N.W. 493 (1923).
7. Russo v. Hocbschild Kohn & Co., 41 A.2d 600 (Md. 1945); cf. Marko v. Sears,
8. Gotham Nat. Bank of New York v. Sharood Co., 23 F.2d 567 (2nd Cir. 1928).
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sequential damages.0 The opposite view is characterized by a Nebraska case
holding that "when plaintiff returned shoes and received payment for the
purchase price, it was an irrevocable election to rescind, and her statement
that she would see the defendants later about her injuries was ineffectual to
modify or disaffirm her election to rescind." 10
The doctrine of election of remedies has been said to rest upon the principle
"he who seeks equity must do equity"."i In a United States Supreme Court
decision it was stated that the doctrine of election of remedies was a harsh
and largely obsolete rule, the scope of which should not be extended.1 In
the Uniform Commercial Code there is no mention of "election" of any sort.
Section 2-608 of the Uniform Commercial Code eliminates the require-
ment that the buyer must elect between rescission and recovery of damages
for bieach of warranty. The remedy under this section is simply referred to
as "revocation of acceptance'.., Under this principle the buyer may not
only revoke passage of title but may also recover damages for non-delivery.14
The measure of damages for non-delivery is "the difference between" the
market price "at the time the buyer learned of the breach and the contract
price together with incidental and consequential damages".13 Incidental
damages includes expenses incurred in the "handling of rejected goods" and
consequential damages include "injury to person or property proximately
resulting from any breach of warranty".16 This would include the damages
asked in the instant case.
In view of the materials discussed it appears that the mere return of de-
fective goods purchased does not raise a conclusive presumption of an intend-
ed rescission which would prevent an action for damages.
Roy A. OLSON
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - ACCIDENTS "ARISING OUT OF EMPLOY-
MENT" - IDIOPATHIc FALLS. - Plaintiff, who suffered from epilepsy, was
going about his customary duties in defendant's factory when he experi-
enced a seizure which caused him to fall and strike his head on the con-
crete floor, thus incurring a cerebral concussion. The Division of Work-
men's Compensation granted an award in favor of the claimant. On final
appeal to the Supreme Court it was held, three justices dissenting, that
the award be set aside. The concrete floor of the plant did not consti-
9. Bagwell v. Susman, 165 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1947).
10. Henry v. Budge & Guenzel Co., 118 Neb. 260, 224 N.W. 294, 296 (1929).
11. Peters v. Bain, 133 U.S. 670, 695 (1889).
12. Friederichsen v. Renard, 247 U.S. 207 (1918).
13. U.C.C. §2-608(1) (1952) "The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or com-
mercial unit whose non-conformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has accepted
it."
14. Id. at §2-711(1) "Where . . . the buyer rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes
acceptance . . . the buyer may . . . (b) recover damages for non-delivery
15. Id. at §2-713(1).
16. Id. at §2-715(1) "Incidental damages resulting from the deller's breach include
expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of
goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in
connection with effecting cover and any damages from delay or otherwise resulting from
the breach. (2) Consequential damages include (a) any loss resulting from general or
particular requirements and needs of which the seller . . . had reason to know . . . (b)
injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty".
